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Corporate Oversight and
Disobedience
Elizabeth Pollman*
Over a decade has passed since landmark Delaware corporate law
decisions on oversight responsibility, and only a small handful of cases have
survived a motion to dismiss. Scholars have puzzled over what it means to
have the potential for corporate accountability lodged within the duty of good
faith, but almost never brought to fruition in terms of trial liability.
This Article explores the public-regarding purpose of the obedience
and oversight duties in corporate law and provides a descriptive account of
how they are applied in practice. The Article argues that the fidelity to
external law required by the duty of good faith largely serves a legitimizing
role for corporate law. Expressing obligations of legal compliance and
oversight within corporate law acknowledges societal interests in the rule of
law and preserves the ability of courts to flexibly respond to particularly
salient and egregious violations of public trust, should they arise, without
upending case law developed over decades.
Further, this Article examines the body of Delaware law concerning
the oversight and obedience aspects of the duty of good faith and argues that
they have become functionally linked. In practice to date, Delaware courts
have prioritized giving directors broad latitude to take business risk by
drawing a line at legal risk, despite the possibility that both types of activity
could create social value or harm depending on the circumstances. Under
current Delaware case law, courts have allowed Caremark claims to proceed
where evidence exists to infer that the board utterly failed to implement a
compliance monitoring system or that the directors engaged in disobedience by
consciously flouting, violating, or ignoring the law. Bringing together these
threads of discussion, this Article concludes that corporate law’s publicregarding commitment to the rule of law supports accountability in these
*
Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. For helpful comments and
suggestions, thanks to participants in the symposium convened by the Vanderbilt Law Review
and the Institute for Law and Economic Policy, and commentators Vice Chancellor Joseph
Slights, Lisa Fairfax, and Salvatore Graziano. This Article also benefited from excellent
comments from Hillary Sale and her corporate governance seminar at Georgetown Law, Ann
Lipton, and participants at the National Business Law Scholars Conference 2019 at Berkeley
Law.
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instances of disobedience as well as more broadly when fiduciaries act with
willful ignorance or an awareness that their efforts at compliance are
insufficient.
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INTRODUCTION
In the corporate law canon lies the promise of powerful
accountability. Decades ago, the potential for the fiduciary duty of care
to be the source of this accountability for corporate directors was lost.
It was stripped of its sting just after its bite in Smith v. Van Gorkom.1
Nearly as soon as the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in the 1985 case
that the directors had acted with gross negligence in corporate
decisionmaking, the state legislature enacted section 102(b)(7) of the
General Corporation Law.2 The outcry from corporate America

1.
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see also William T. Allen, The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary
Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule Under U.S. Law, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 307, 324 (Klaus J. Hopt et al.
eds., 1998) (“The long history that was inconsistent with courts directly imposing liability on
corporate directors for violation of the objective standard of care was interrupted by the decision
of the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom.”); Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of
Care Component of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 977 (1994)
(“[B]efore the mid-eighties . . . the business judgment rule had been applied in such a manner as
to constitute an almost per se bar to shareholder claims of directors’ breach of their fiduciary
duty of care.”).
2.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2019); E. Norman Veasey, Jesse A. Finkelstein & C.
Stephen Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability,
Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW. 399, 401–04 (1987) (discussing the enactment of
§ 102(b)(7) in 1986).
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demanded this response—corporations were given the freedom to put
exculpatory provisions in their charters eliminating the personal
liability of directors for monetary damages for breach of the duty of
care.3 Corporate directors could thereafter rest easy knowing that
absent fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing, they would rarely, if ever, pay
out of pocket for harming the corporation, even if their service had
been far less than perfect.4
But the potential for corporate accountability through fiduciary
duty law was not entirely extinguished. Setting aside traditional duty
of loyalty issues such as self-dealing, the duty of good faith remained
as a potential mechanism for accountability that could not be
exculpated. Two aspects of the duty of good faith—obedience and
oversight—soon came into sharper focus through a series of cases that
joined Smith v. Van Gorkom in the corporate law canon: In re
Caremark International Inc.;5 In re Walt Disney Co.;6 and Stone v.
Ritter.7
Through these cases, the Delaware courts established a claim
for what became known as Caremark liability, which involves an utter
failure to implement an information and reporting system to allow the
board to monitor the legal compliance of the corporation or a conscious
failure to monitor its operations.8 A successful claim requires showing
that “the directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary
obligations”—that is, a “conscious disregard” of their oversight
responsibilities, which implicates the duty of good faith.9 Further, the
Delaware Supreme Court clarified that a breach of the duty of good
faith can also be shown in any instance in which the fiduciary acts

3.
See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance
Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160 (1990) (“A little over a year after the [D&O insurance] crisis
began, Delaware enacted a statute permitting corporations to eliminate their directors’ liability
for monetary damages for breaching their duty of care.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role
of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 660–61 (2010) (“Fear that verdicts like Van
Gorkom could be common drove up directors and officers liability insurance costs and gave
directors reason to be concerned about service. Section 102(b)(7) was the General Assembly’s
answer to that problem.”).
4.
See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1063–64 (2006) (finding that from 1980 to 2005 outside directors of public
companies made out-of-pocket payments in only thirteen cases); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I
Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 490 (2000) (“Charter provision enabling statutes
like Delaware’s section 102(b)(7), moreover, have been almost universally implemented by
corporations to which such laws apply.”).
5.
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
6.
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
7.
911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
8.
Id. at 370.
9.
Id.
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with a purpose other than advancing the best interests of the
corporation, intentionally disregards duties, or intends to violate
positive law.10 As part of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, claims of bad
faith cannot be exculpated.11
Over a decade has passed since these landmark decisions, and
with virtually no cases going to trial and resulting in liability, scholars
have puzzled over whether Caremark oversight responsibility is a
“practical irrelevance”12 or only “soft law.”13 And, despite a constant
stream of media headlines exposing corporate illegality, shareholder
suits successfully holding directors liable for breaking the law are
extremely rare.14 This state of affairs raises the question of what it
means to have the potential for corporate accountability lodged within
the duty of good faith but almost never brought to fruition in terms of
trial liability.
This Article offers a two-fold answer to this question—a
descriptive theory of the purpose of the obedience and oversight duties
in corporate law, and a functional account of how they are applied in
practice. First, this Article argues that the fidelity to external law
required by the duty of good faith largely serves a legitimizing role for
corporate law.15 Shareholders cannot be counted on to police corporate
illegality, and oversight failures may rarely rise to the level of
conscious disregard. The fiduciary duty of good faith is neither
irrelevant nor toothless, however—it embeds a safety valve for public
policy in the obligations of fiduciaries that cannot be eliminated.
Expressing legal compliance and oversight obligations within
corporate law acknowledges societal interests in the rule of law and
preserves the ability of courts to flexibly respond to particularly
10. Id. at 369–70; In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 67.
11. Stone, 911 A.2d at 367, 369–70.
12. Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15, 43 (2013); see also
Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, In re Caremark: Good Intentions, Unintended
Consequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691, 692 (2004) (characterizing Caremark as “an empty
triumph of form over substance”).
13. Claire A. Hill, Caremark as Soft Law, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 682, 697 (2018) (arguing
that Caremark has “considerable, albeit soft force”).
14. See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 756 (2019) (“Despite
widespread corporate illegality, there are few modern cases in which shareholders have
successfully held directors liable for breaking the law.”); see also KENT GREENFIELD, THE
FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 75 (2006)
(“[T]here is not a single, modern case that holds directors liable to shareholders just because the
directors or the corporation broke the law.”); Norwood P. Beveridge, Does the Corporate Director
Have a Duty Always to Obey the Law?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 729, 732 (1996) (“[T]here is no such
thing as a corporation . . . in compliance with law; rather, there are only corporations (and
businesses) out of compliance with law to varying degrees. Despite that fact, there are no modern
cases holding directors liable to shareholders for breaking the law.”).
15. See infra Part II.
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salient and egregious violations of public trust, should they arise,
without upending case law developed over decades.
Second, this Article examines the body of Delaware law
concerning the oversight and obedience aspects of the duty of good
faith and argues that they have become functionally linked.16
Corporate law takes legal obedience as a strict requirement, and the
Caremark doctrine creates a mandate for the board to put in place and
monitor some system of compliance, but beyond this minimal
threshold courts have not policed the effectiveness of oversight.
Rather, the potential for oversight liability through fiduciary duty
doctrine arises in the limited context of an utter failure to implement
a board-level monitoring and reporting system or when fiduciaries
flout, violate, or ignore laws with a level of scienter that rises to
conscious disregard or intent. In practice, Delaware courts have
prioritized giving directors broad latitude to take business risk by
drawing a line at legal risk, despite the possibility that both types of
activity could create social value or harm depending on the
circumstances.17 Moreover, examining Delaware case law reveals that
courts have stringently reviewed the pleadings for Caremark claims,
requiring particularized factual allegations of conscious disregard that
resembles intent to violate the law or acquiescence in misconduct.
With limited exception, the handful of Delaware cases alleging
Caremark claims that have survived motions to dismiss involved
particularized allegations of a complete lack of board oversight or
egregious disobedience—in circumstances in which the corporation
was allegedly engaged in pervasive wrongdoing, when facts supported
an inference that directors were complicit in fraudulent business
models or deceiving regulators, and when rogue corporations
expressed disagreement with underlying laws.
Bringing together these threads of discussion, this Article’s
analysis concludes with the observation that corporate law’s publicregarding commitment to the rule of law supports accountability in
these instances of disobedience as well as more broadly when
fiduciaries act with willful ignorance or an awareness that their
efforts at compliance are insufficient. Knowing action or inaction that
does not further lawful business is inconsistent with the dictates of
corporate law. Although derivative litigation is often an imperfect tool
for corporate accountability and drawing a line between business and
legal risk is debatable from a social welfare perspective, the doctrinal

16. See infra Section III.A.
17. See infra Section III.B.
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foundations exist for a robust understanding of the obligations of
oversight and obedience.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on
the fiduciary duty doctrines of legal obedience and oversight. Part II
looks to the content and structure of the duty of good faith, and
specifically the obedience and oversight obligations, to evince a
positive theory of the role of these obligations within corporate law. It
argues that evolving statutory law and fiduciary duty jurisprudence
have recognized that these obligations cannot be eliminated because
they preserve a safety valve for protecting public policy, which springs
from the same source as corporate charters—the state. The obedience
and oversight aspects of the duty of good faith serve to legitimize
corporate law. Part III provides a descriptive account of the doctrines
in practice, showing that Caremark and its progeny set forth a
minimum threshold for establishing and maintaining a compliance
system at the board level, after which the possibility of liability arises
once conduct enters a zone of disobedience. The Part concludes with
observations about the implications of this doctrinal trend.
I. OBEDIENCE AND OVERSIGHT
State corporate law expresses fidelity to legal compliance
through dual requirements of obedience and oversight. The obligation
of obedience concerns the corporation itself, which must serve a
“lawful purpose,” and its directors, who have fiduciary duties that
prohibit them from acting with the intention of violating the law. The
obligation of oversight concerns the monitoring function of the board
of directors to ensure the legal compliance of actors within the
corporation. This Part examines both of these obligations in turn,
laying the groundwork for exploring their underlying purpose in
theory and function in practice.
A. The Longstanding Requirement of Legal Obedience
An endless variety of businesses may organize through the
corporate form, but as a matter of fundamental principles, they are all
required to engage in only lawful conduct. Corporate statutes enshrine
this prime directive of obedience.18 For example, section 101(b) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law provides: “A corporation may be
incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote

18. Strine et al., supra note 3, at 649.
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any lawful business or purposes, except as may otherwise be provided
by the Constitution or of the law of this State.”19
As I have observed elsewhere, this statutory requirement “of
lawful conduct can be understood in historical context and as a
function of the basic fact that it is only through government-granted
charters that corporations exist.”20 Until the mid-nineteenth century,
state legislatures chartered corporations through special acts for
specifically authorized activity.21 It logically follows from the
government grant of a corporate charter that the provision of power
was limited to the confines of state-imposed legal boundaries.22
Further, when states adopted general incorporation statutes, the
specification of a particular business purpose in the charter was
liberalized, but the requirement of lawful conduct remained.23 And,
although corporate statutes typically refer to the granting of charters
for a lawful purpose, courts and commentators have generally
interpreted this language to broadly refer to an ongoing obligation of
lawful business operation.24
Following this statutory requirement, longstanding judicial
practice dictates that deference is not accorded to fiduciaries who

19. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2019).
20. Pollman, supra note 14, at 719.
21. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, 14–17 (1970); Robert B. Thompson, Why New Corporate Law
Arises: Implications for the Twenty-First Century, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING
TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? 3, 5–6 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas eds.,
2019).
22. See Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1452 (1987) (“That a corporation derived its powers from
the sovereign was inherent in the contractual conception of the grant theory. The government
granted nothing unless it agreed to the objects of the proposed corporation.”).
23. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 18861936, 50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 29 (1936):
Financial institutions and railroads were generally regarded as requiring special
treatment, but the earlier manufacturing corporation acts tended to evolve, either by
the inclusion of other types of corporations or by the insertion of a provision for the
formation of corporations for any lawful purpose other than those specifically
excepted, into substantially what we know today as business corporation acts.
On the topic of illegality and the ultra vires doctrine, see Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A
Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce
International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1314 (2001) (“During the height of the ultra
vires doctrine, a corporation’s illegal activities were considered a subset of the larger category of
ultra vires activities. In no sense were corporations considered as having the authority to
perform illegal activities, even when performed to advance the interest of the firm.”); and Alan R.
Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 460 (2011) (“[T]he
original ultra vires doctrine not only set the boundaries of corporate power as established by
corporate norms, it also recognized that the corporation is powerless to violate non-corporate
norms—that is, external law.”).
24. Pollman, supra note 14, at 721.
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direct the corporation to violate the law. As a doctrinal matter, over a
century of case law provides that corporate directors and officers who
engage in unlawful conduct on behalf of the corporation do not receive
business judgment rule protection.25 Courts have explained that “a
fiduciary may not choose to manage an entity in an illegal fashion,
even if the fiduciary believes that the illegal activity will result in
profits for the entity.”26
In 2006, in the landmark case of In re Walt Disney Co., the
Delaware Supreme Court clarified how this deep-rooted requirement
of legal obedience fits within the framework of fiduciary duties.27
Plaintiff shareholders in the derivative suit challenged an
“unfortunate hiring decision at Disney”28 that had resulted in a $130
million severance package paid to a senior executive upon his
termination after little more than a year of work at the company.29 As
the Disney charter had a director exculpation provision pursuant to
section 102(b)(7), any liability for the breach of the duty of care was
foreclosed. This left only claims of waste—easily disposed of by the
court—and breach of the duty of good faith, since no traditional duty
of loyalty issue was implicated in the context of independent
decisionmaking.30 Acknowledging the duty to act in good faith had
played a prominent role in the plaintiff-shareholders’ case and was an
area of corporate fiduciary law “up to this point relatively uncharted,”
the court took the opportunity to provide “conceptual guidance to the
corporate community.”31 It explained:
25. See, e.g., Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that shareholders
had stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty arising from the alleged violation of federal
campaign finance law and noting the business judgment rule “cannot insulate the defendant
directors from liability if they did in fact breach [a statutory prohibition], as plaintiffs have
charged”); Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 354 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1909) (sustaining recovery from
a director who used corporate funds to bribe individuals who had threatened to complain about
the corporation operating in violation of the state’s Sunday closing laws).
26. Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 131 (Del.
Ch. 2004); see also Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[O]ne cannot act
loyally as a corporate director by causing the corporation to violate the positive laws it is obliged
to obey.”).
27. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). For a tracing of the historical shift from treating obedience as
an issue of corporate power to fiduciary duty related to “compliance with noncorporate legal
norms,” see Palmiter, supra note 23, at 462–64, 474.
28. In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 36.
29. Id. at 35.
30. See Strine et al., supra note 3, at 692:
Prevented from arguing a breach of the duty of care, . . . plaintiffs’ lawyers saw
an opportunity to reframe the debate and argue that the independent directors
had approved a transaction in bad faith, and to push judges to treat directorial
behavior that appeared to be less adroit and diligent than was reasonable as
indicative of bad faith.
31. In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 64.
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[T]he universe of fiduciary misconduct is not limited to either disloyalty in the classic
sense (i.e., preferring the adverse self-interest of the fiduciary or of a related person to
the interest of the corporation) or gross negligence. Cases have arisen where corporate
directors have no conflicting self-interest in a decision, yet engage in misconduct that is
more culpable than simple inattention or failure to be informed of all facts material to
the decision. To protect the interests of the corporation and its shareholders, fiduciary
conduct of this kind, which does not involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but is
qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence, should be proscribed. A vehicle is
needed to address such violations doctrinally, and that doctrinal vehicle is the duty to
act in good faith.32

Further, the court clarified that a fiduciary could breach the
duty to act in good faith in a variety of ways, including through acts of
legal disobedience:
A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary
intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the
corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law,
or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act,
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.33

After In re Walt Disney Co., acting with intent to violate the
law was clearly proscribed as a breach of the duty of good faith,
stamped with the moral judgment of being more culpable than gross
negligence and out of bounds for exculpation.34 In sum, as a matter of
Delaware corporate law, both the statute and case law from the
highest arbiter have required legal obedience, without qualification or
exceptions, as an “essential bottom-line requirement.”35
B. Oversight and Compliance Responsibility in Fiduciary Law
Moving to a relatively more modern area of doctrinal
development, the starting point for tracing the evolution of Delaware’s
oversight jurisprudence is, by common practice, the 1963 case Graham
v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.36 The derivative action alleged
that the directors of Allis-Chalmers had breached their fiduciary
duties by failing to prevent violations of federal antitrust laws by the
corporation’s employees.37 The Delaware Supreme Court found no
liability on the facts, holding that “absent cause for suspicion there is
no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of

32. Id. at 66.
33. Id. at 67.
34. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997) (describing Delaware judicial opinions that describe legal
standards of conduct as “corporate law sermons”).
35. Strine et al., supra note 3, at 649–50.
36. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
37. Id. at 127.
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espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to
suspect exists.”38
Three decades later, the Delaware Court of Chancery
reassessed this precedent in the case that became synonymous with
oversight responsibility: In re Caremark International Inc.39 The story
began in 1994 when the federal government indicted Caremark for
violating the Anti-Referral Payments Law, a statute prohibiting
healthcare businesses from paying doctors and other providers for
referring Medicare or Medicaid patients.40 By mid-1995, Caremark
settled the federal litigation by pleading guilty to mail fraud, paying
criminal fines, and entering into a monetary settlement for civil
claims.41 Together with settlement payments for related private party
litigation, the company paid $250 million in total to resolve the claims
regarding its improper business practices.42
Subsequently, Caremark shareholders brought derivative suits
against the board, seeking to hold the members individually liable for
the losses suffered by the corporation.43 The suits ended in a
settlement agreement, which provided for no monetary liability but
created a plan designed to ensure legal compliance going forward.44
All that was before the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1996 was
judicial approval of the settlement, which was deemed fair and
reasonable to the class. Chancellor William Allen did not let the
moment pass unnoticed, however, and seeded into the opinion’s dicta
the notion that an altogether different claim than negligent
decisionmaking had been at stake. Invoking Graham, the opinion
observed evolving regulatory trends at the time, such as the
increasing use of criminal sanctions in federal law to ensure corporate
compliance and the mitigation of sanctions under federal criminal
sentencing guidelines for corporate defendants that had compliance
programs in place.45 In light of these developments, the court noted it
could no longer interpret Graham in a way that suggested a board has
no affirmative obligation to put some information and reporting
system in place to monitor legal compliance.46 Consequently, the court
explained that in carrying out their oversight responsibility, the
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 130.
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Id. at 961–63.
Id. at 960–61.
Id.
See id. at 964.
Id. at 966.
Id. at 969–70.
Id. at 970.
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directors had “a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a
corporate information and reporting system, which the board
concludes is adequate, exists and that failure to do so under some
circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for
losses caused by noncompliance with applicable legal standards.”47
Commenting that this basis for oversight liability “is possibly
the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff
might hope to win judgment,”48 the court opined that
plaintiffs would have to show either (1) that the directors knew or (2) should have
known that violations of law were occurring and, in either event, (3) that the directors
took no steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy that situation, and (4) that such
failure proximately resulted in the losses complained of.49

Chancellor Allen concluded on the record before him that there was
“essentially no evidence” of a violation—the facts did “not support the
conclusion that the defendants either lacked good faith in the exercise
of their monitoring responsibilities or conscientiously permitted a
known violation of law . . . to occur.”50
The landmark case gave rise to the notion under corporate law
of a “Caremark claim”—alleging breach of fiduciary duty for failure to
provide board oversight. And a decade later, in 2006, a pair of cases
came before the Delaware Supreme Court that affirmed the validity of
a Caremark claim, gave meaning to the fiduciary duty of good faith,
and cabined it within the fiduciary duty of loyalty, which cannot be
exculpated. First, as discussed above, In re Walt Disney Co. elucidated
a variety of ways in which a fiduciary could breach the duty to act in
good faith—notably including not only acting with an intent to violate
positive law, but also acting with a purpose other than that of
advancing the best interests of the corporation or with a conscious
disregard of duties.51 Second, in Stone v. Ritter, an oversight case
involving “a classic Caremark claim”52 in which a bank corporation
paid $50 million in fines and penalties for violations of federal antimoney laundering regulations, the court explained that the previous
articulation of director oversight liability was valid and required a
showing of scienter constituting bad faith.53

47. Id.
48. Id. at 967.
49. Id. at 971.
50. Id. at 971–72; see also Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 719 (2007) (discussing the Caremark opinion and its implications for the development of
corporate law and governance).
51. 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).
52. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006).
53. Id. at 370–73.
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Specifically, the Stone court held that “the necessary conditions
predicate for director oversight liability” include showing either “(a)
the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information
system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or
controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems
requiring their attention.”54 Further, “[i]n either case, imposition of
liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not
discharging their fiduciary obligations.”55 Such a showing of “conscious
disregard” for discharging fiduciary obligations in good faith amounts
to a breach of the duty of loyalty.56
Notably, the case law has developed in the context of
settlement opinions and motions to dismiss. As in Graham and
Caremark, the Stone court found that despite significant financial loss
to the corporation for the violation of criminal laws by employees, the
plaintiffs had failed to plead demand futility with regard to their
oversight claim against the directors.57 According to the court, the
plaintiffs sought “to equate a bad outcome with bad faith” without
recognizing that “good faith exercise of oversight responsibility may
not invariably prevent employees from violating criminal laws, or from
causing the corporation to incur significant financial liability, or
both.”58 Critically, “[i]n the absence of red flags, good faith in the
context of oversight must be measured by the directors’ actions ‘to
assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists’ and not
by second-guessing after the occurrence of employee conduct that
results in an unintended adverse outcome.”59
A small number of cases involving Caremark claims have
survived motions to dismiss. In Marchand v. Barnhill, for example,
the Delaware Supreme Court applied the standard articulated in
Stone and found that the plaintiffs had successfully pled
particularized facts to support a claim that the board of ice cream
manufacturer Blue Bell Creameries “failed to implement any system
to monitor Blue Bell’s food safety performance or compliance.”60 In

54. Id. at 370 (emphasis in original).
55. Id. For an argument that the convergence of good faith and oversight was “one of those
unfortunate marriages that leaves both sides worse off,” see Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The
Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 605 (2008).
56. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
57. Id. at 373.
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch.
1996)).
60. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809 (Del. 2019).
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that case, the company suffered a listeria outbreak that killed three
people and caused the company to recall all its products, shut down
production, lay off a significant portion of its workforce, and accept a
dilutive private equity financing.61 As the ice cream manufacturer
makes only a single product, the court noted that food safety is a
central compliance issue for the company and the complaint therefore
created a reasonable inference that the “dearth of any board-level
effort at monitoring” was a conscious failure.62 Although few cases
have met the stringent standard applied at the motion to dismiss
stage, the Delaware courts have consistently recognized the potential
validity of claims against directors based on oversight failures.
II. A POSITIVE ACCOUNT OF THE LEGITIMIZING ROLE OF THE
DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
With this groundwork set, we can now turn to a deeper
question: What is the purpose of these dual requirements of obedience
and oversight? Delaware law is largely enabling—it has, “for the most
part, chosen to let corporations decide what constraints, if any, they
should impose on their fiduciaries.”63 Corporations can eliminate
monetary damages for directors stemming from a breach of the duty of
care and can carve out significant aspects of the duty of loyalty
through waivers of corporate opportunity doctrine.64 Yet a certain core
of fiduciary duty remains mandatory, beyond the reach of private
ordering, and at the heart of this is the elusive duty of good faith,
which contains both obedience and oversight responsibility.
Scholars have offered wide-ranging accounts of the content and
structure of the duty of good faith,65 its scienter-like nature,66 its

61. Id. at 807.
62. Id. at 809.
63. Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 462 (2004).
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 122(17) (2019); see also Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric
Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate
Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075 (2017) (finding that over one thousand public
corporations have adopted corporate opportunity waivers).
65. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1, 1–2 (2006) (describing the substantive content of the duty of good faith and arguing
the duty is normatively desirable); Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate
Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 462 (2009) (discussing “the new fiduciary duty of loyalty” postStone v. Ritter that includes the duty of good faith); Robert B. Thompson, The Short, But
Interesting Life of Good Faith as an Independent Liability Rule, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 543, 544
(2010) (examining explanations for “the rise of good faith”); Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary
Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1234–35 (2010) (identifying “five
different paradigms for the enforcement of fiduciary duties,” including good faith, which signifies
“misconduct”).
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rhetorical value,67 and its shortcomings.68 But little literature has
highlighted that its obedience and oversight obligations serve a public
function.69 The requirement of fidelity to the law aims to protect
society’s interests, not those of the corporation.70
This point can be evinced, as a positive matter, by the fact that
directors may not, consistent with their fiduciary obligations, choose
to violate the law, even if they intend to benefit the corporation or its
shareholders in doing so. Delaware courts reflect this understanding,
noting that “the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases
involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of
interest.”71 Fiduciaries may violate the duty of loyalty even when they
pursue profits for the corporation and are not acting out of selfinterest. In Guttman v. Huang, the chancery court explained:
The General Assembly could contribute usefully to ending the balkanization of the duty
of loyalty by rewriting § 102(b)(7) to make clear that its subparts all illustrate conduct
that is disloyal. For example, one cannot act loyally as a corporate director by causing
the corporation to violate the positive laws it is obliged to obey.72

66. See Strine et al., supra note 3, at 644 (describing good faith as “the state of mind
required of a loyal fiduciary exercising corporate powers”).
67. See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate
Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 34 (2005) (“[C]ourts applying the good faith standard do not
confine themselves to the analytics of either traditional fiduciary duty. Instead, good faith is
used as a loose rhetorical device that courts can wield to find liability or enjoin actions that do
not quite fit within established doctrinal categories.”).
68. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Not in Good Faith, 60 SMU L. REV. 441, 491 (2007)
(arguing that an “exacting definition of the phrase ‘not in good faith,’ ” which describes nonexculpable conduct by directors, “is needed to ensure directors are held accountable”); Sale, supra
note 63, at 482–94 (offering suggestions for the role of good faith and its application to corporate
fiduciaries).
69. Notable works to do so include Hillary A. Sale, Fiduciary Law, Good Faith and
Publicness, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 763 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller &
Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2018) (discussing the relationship between the duty of good faith, the rule
of law, and publicness); Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933,
939 (2017) (observing that the government’s interest in compliance is not mainly to reduce
agency costs, but rather to push corporations toward “accepting public-regarding
responsibilities”); and Pollman, supra note 14, at 749–50 (“The statutory dictate serves not only
this expressive function, but it also, quite notably, embeds society’s interests into corporate
law . . . .”).
70. Pollman, supra note 14, at 717; see also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 1992) (“Even if
corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct
of its business: (1) Is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the
boundaries set by law . . . .”).
71. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
72. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003); see Palmiter, supra note 23,
at 458–59 (arguing for the revival of a separate fiduciary duty of obedience to “resolve much of
the confusion engendered by the ‘duty of good faith’ ” and serve as a “reminder of the
corporation’s exogenous effects”); see also Gold, supra note 65, at 477 (noting “the loyalty
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The mode of analysis that courts apply to issues of obedience
and oversight also reflects an understanding that fidelity to the law is
nonnegotiable and is a requirement that aims to protect a public
realm to which corporate law must subscribe, rather than to protect
shareholders from agency costs.73 Case law focuses on public law
obligations.74 Courts not only refrain from applying business judgment
rule protection when the issue at stake involves a potential legal
violation—they also do not engage in entire fairness analysis, which
would look to the fiduciary’s treatment of the corporation, as that is
not the relevant inquiry.75 Instead, the doctrine of good faith inquires
into the intent or conscious disregard of the director in making
decisions concerning legality or the monitoring of unlawful conduct
within the corporation.76
Further, to the extent that fidelity to the law is imposed not
only through the corporate statute but also through fiduciary law, it
must be lodged in a nonexculpable duty if it is to provide legitimacy
and preserve the ability of courts to act in the face of egregious
violations. This is the path that the legislature took in section
102(b)(7) by carving out “acts or omissions not in good faith or which
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law” and the
Delaware Supreme Court followed in In re Walt Disney Co. and
Stone—to do otherwise would undermine the utility of good faith to

implications of a director’s duty to comply with positive law are closely tied to the loyalty
implications of a director’s intentional failure to perform known duties”).
73. Some aspects of the fiduciary duty of good faith may serve to combat agency costs, such
as the use of appropriate and adequate monitoring systems which may constrain management
from engaging in legal violations for self-serving purposes. See Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark
and Compliance: A Twenty-Year Lookback, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 727, 739–40 (2018) (examining how
selection, promotion, and compensation decisions can influence corporate culture and risktaking); Sale, supra note 50, at 752 (discussing good faith and agency costs). The point here is
that the aspect of good faith that is focused on legal compliance also, or perhaps primarily, serves
a public purpose and legitimizing role for corporate law, as can be seen from the fact that
corporate law does not tolerate illegality even when it would be profit maximizing for
corporations.
74. See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 1907, 1965–66 (2013) (“The case law articulating the ‘duty to legality’ seems to focus on
public law obligations such as campaign finance laws, bribery, price fixing, mine safety
regulations, off-label marketing of prescription drugs, and unfair labor practices.” (footnotes
omitted)); see also Frank Partnoy, Corporations and Human Life, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 399, 418
(2017) (“[T]he focus of risk management oversight is often on considerations of regulatory
violations and tort liability.”).
75. See Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 29 (arguing that “limiting rules [such as the business
judgment rule and entire fairness] should be and are inapplicable to conduct that violates the
duty of good faith, because of the high degree of wrongfulness that such conduct involves”).
76. For an argument that mental-state inquiry such as the corporate law doctrine of good
faith is the best way to identify evasive actors, see Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law
Evasion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 611 (2011).
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serve as a safety valve in the interest of public policy.77 In this
interpretation, the obligations of obedience and oversight are
mandatory not because they would likely be the subject of bargaining
failure or divergence between the interests of shareholders and
managers but because they allow corporate law to reflect public values
and police extreme cases at the margins.78
Taking this observation a step further, by requiring legal
obedience of the corporation and its directors, both in their
decisionmaking capacity and in their role in establishing and
maintaining an information and reporting system for compliance, we
could view corporate law as acknowledging that ultimately
corporations exist by grace of the state and an implicit social contract
that protects public policy. Arguably, a clear way to reflect respect for
this bargain underpinning corporate law is to affirm allegiance to the
rule of law without second-guessing the merits of external laws or
allowing for exceptions motivated by profit. Lodging these expressions
within the duty of good faith amplifies the foundational statutory
requirement of lawful conduct and allows for judicial review.79
Corporations produce a continual flow of externalities; embedding a

77. Then-Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr. charted this path in Guttman v. Huang by
characterizing Caremark as implicating the duty of loyalty instead of care. Guttman, 823 A.2d at
506 n.34 (“It does no service to our law’s clarity to continue to separate the duty of loyalty from
its own essence; nor does the recognition that good faith is essential to loyalty demean or
subordinate that essential requirement.”); see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise
Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 975 (2009) (“In Guttman, however, Vice Chancellor Strine
ripped the Caremark claim from its original home in the duty of care and reinvented it as a duty
of loyalty . . . .”); see also Eisenberg, supra note 65, at 12–21 (critiquing Strine’s dyadic approach
to fiduciary duties).
78. This view potentially supplements other explanations for why some fiduciary
obligations remain mandatory in corporate law. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure
of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1462 (1989) (arguing that fiduciary duties should
be mandatory at the core given the limits of bargaining, the potential for divergence between the
interests of shareholders and managers, and because variations may not be accurately priced);
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1554
(1989) (arguing “the mixed system of optional and mandatory legal rules that we observe may be
best even from an essentially contractarian perspective”); see also Brian Broughman, Elizabeth
Pollman & D. Gordon Smith, Fiduciary Law and the Preservation of Trust in Business
Relationships, in FIDUCIARIES AND TRUST: ETHICS, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND LAW (Paul B.
Miller & Matthew Harding eds., forthcoming 2020) (arguing that mandatory fiduciary duties
enable the preservation of trust in business relationships).
79. See Buell, supra note 76, at 653 (“Stone and Lyondell, and their embrace of Caremark,
are a choice by the Delaware courts to make clear that good faith is not a duty but an ancillary
tool that fortifies background law.”). Delaware courts have acknowledged their public role. See,
e.g., Steinberg v. Bryant, No. 2017-0736-SG, 2017 WL 6054943, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 2017)
(“The Court of Chancery, like any public court, ‘serves not only the litigants before it; it has a
public function as well.’ ” (quoting Al Jazeera Am., LLC v. AT&T Servs., Inc., No. 8823-VCG,
2013 WL 5614284, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2013)).
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duty of obedience to laws and regulations that constrain these
externalities for the good of society helps to legitimize corporate law.
Along these lines, fidelity to the law has been the subject of a
number of “corporate law sermons,”80 proclaiming corporate law’s
dedication to the rule of law. For example, in Desimone v. Barrows,
the Delaware Court of Chancery explained:
[B]y consciously causing the corporation to violate the law, a director would be disloyal
to the corporation and could be forced to answer for the harm he has caused. Although
directors have wide authority to take lawful action on behalf of the corporation, they
have no authority knowingly to cause the corporation to become a rogue, exposing the
corporation to penalties from criminal and civil regulators.81

Similarly, In re Massey Energy Co. includes the following
passage:
Delaware law does not charter law breakers. Delaware law allows corporations to
pursue diverse means to make a profit, subject to a critical statutory floor, which is the
requirement that Delaware corporations only pursue “lawful business” by “lawful
acts.” As a result, a fiduciary of a Delaware corporation cannot be loyal to a Delaware
corporation by knowingly causing it to seek profit by violating the law.82

Further, the court invokes the role of the strict parent who will
not tolerate a teenager’s excuse for youthful shenanigans and trouble
with the law:
Telling your parents that all the kids are getting caught shoplifting, cheating, or
imbibing illegal substances is not, fortunately, a good excuse. For fiduciaries of
Delaware corporations, there is no room to flout the law governing the corporation’s
affairs. If the fiduciaries of a Delaware corporation do not like the applicable law, they
can lobby to get it changed. But until it is changed, they must act in good faith to ensure
that the corporation tries to comply with its legal duties.83

Caremark itself can be viewed as a “seminal ‘message’ opinion,”
catalyzing lawyers to advise corporate clients to put in place
compliance systems and be mindful of oversight obligations.84 In all,
80. See Rock, supra note 34, at 1013–16 (describing how “Delaware courts provide a
supplemental source of gossip, criticism, and sanction for this set of actors who are beyond the
reach of the firm’s normal systems of social control”).
81. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934 (Del. Ch. 2007). Notably, while serving on the
Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court, Leo E. Strine, Jr. has been particularly
vocal in expressing the importance of fidelity to the law and has played an influential role in
shaping this understanding of a public-regarding corporate law.
82. In re Massey Energy Co. No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *20 (Del. Ch. May 31,
2011) (footnote omitted).
83. Id. at *21 (footnote omitted).
84. Langevoort, supra note 73, at 729 (citing John H. Walsh, A History of Compliance, in
MODERN COMPLIANCE: BEST PRACTICES FOR SECURITIES & FINANCE 5, 30 (David H. Lui & John
H. Walsh eds., 2015)) (discussing lawyers’ advice to boards after Caremark); see also Stavros
Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2135, 2139
(2019) (arguing that “legal and compliance officers have great power because they can alter
board members’ incentives, and ensure that board members become aware of information they
might prefer to ignore”).
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this moralizing and messaging underscores an awareness of the
legitimizing role that obedience and oversight serve within corporate
law.
To the extent that corporations do not display minimal respect
for the law and compliance failures become salient, we could expect
public pushback85 and the threat of further federalization of corporate
law.86 The good faith obligations of obedience and oversight thus serve
the expressive purpose of reinforcing the legitimacy of corporate law
and also preserve its ability to react—a failsafe for egregious
violations,87 rather than an effective and fine-tuned mechanism for the
bulk of instances, which are left for other regulators and enforcers.88
Providing a failsafe within the structure of corporate law allows for
flexible adaptation when needed, rather than upending the entire
system when a major controversy demands an unprecedented
response.89

85. See Langevoort, supra note 73, at 741–42 (“The Chancellor knew that if boards failed to
become more sophisticated and sensitive to doing [compliance] well—the cultural part as well as
the policies and procedures—external pressures would continue to grow without regard to cost or
efficiency.”); see also Hill, supra note 13, at 695 (arguing that “a profit-maximizing firm will have
to consider not only what law requires but also what reputation requires,” which may
“increasingly come to include corporate social responsibility”); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B.
Thompson, ‘‘Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO.
L.J. 337, 341 (2013) (arguing “that, to a greater extent than generally acknowledged, the broader
demands of publicness drive the creation of contemporary securities regulation”); Palmiter, supra
note 23, at 475 (“The corporation, as distrusted as ever, would lose its social standing if it openly
declared itself to be an unrepentant sociopath.”); Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation,
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2011, at 137, 138 (describing the influence of government and the
media on corporations and their “changing obligations”).
86. See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform,
29 J. CORP. L. 625, 625 (2004) (arguing that “a realistic threat of federalization is necessary to
ensure the robust development of corporate law at the state level”); Marcel Kahan & Edward
Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1576
(2005) (arguing that “the possibility of federal preemption constitutes a threat to Delaware, but
this threat is significant only in times—such as during the recent corporate scandals—when
systemic change is seen as generating a significant populist payoff”); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s
Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 644–46 (2003) (“What remains with the states is the
corporate law that the federal players tolerate, and what gets reversed is that which they do
not.”). For an argument that the standard of liability for compliance oversight failures is too lax
and directors should be subject to a clawback of stock-based pay, see John Armour, Jeffrey N.
Gordon & Geeyoung Min, Taking Compliance Seriously (Columbia Law and Econ., Working
Paper
No.
588,
2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3244167
[https://perma.cc/XYU4-JS3P].
87. See Strine et al., supra note 3, at 634 (“[W]e acknowledge that the duty of loyalty
remains, as it always has, most difficult to apply to circumstances when directors act without an
apparent selfish interest to injure the corporation. We also acknowledge that it is in that context
that the concept of good faith has its greatest utility.”).
88. Pollman, supra note 14, at 751–57 (explaining why shareholder litigation cannot be
relied on to police corporate disobedience).
89. Good faith in contract law also serves this policy objective of allowing a judge to invoke
the doctrine “to do justice and do it according to law.” See Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in
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III. THE DOCTRINAL CONVERGENCE OF CAREMARK
CLAIMS AND DISOBEDIENCE
Obedience and oversight obligations are not only linked
conceptually through expressions of fidelity to the law and as part of
the safety valve that good faith provides within corporate law, but are
also connected in practice through the standard that has evolved for
Caremark liability. This Part turns to an examination of this case law.
At the time of this writing, approximately one hundred
Delaware cases have cited the 1996 landmark Caremark opinion.
Oversight liability after a trial on the merits is extremely rare.90
Instead, the case law has developed through settlement opinions and
motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and the pre-suit demand
requirement of Rule 23.1, with few claims surviving such motions.91
Examining these cases reveals that oversight has evolved in
application to require a showing that borders on, or includes, utter
failure or disobedience.
As the first part of the discussion below explores, a board can
immunize itself from liability under the first prong of Caremark by
simply demonstrating that it has put in place some system of
compliance that is monitored at the board level. And, as the second
part of the discussion demonstrates, successful pleading of the second
Caremark prong has in practice involved particularized factual
assertions that suggest board-level participation in illegality or
improper managing of legal risk. Through these cases, courts have
drawn a line between the oversight of business risk and legal risk—
the former given wide allowance and the latter deemed improper. In

General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV.
195, 198–99 (1968) (“Without legal resources of this general nature [a judge] might, in a
particular case, be unable to do justice at all, or he might be able to do it only at the cost of
fictionalizing existing legal concepts and rules, thereby snarling up the law for future cases.”).
90. In a post-trial opinion in ATR-Kim Eng Financial Corp. v. Araneta, the Delaware Court
of Chancery found that two directors breached their duty of loyalty by failing to monitor the
controlling shareholder and board chair’s self-dealing and by being “complicit[ ] in his wrongful
endeavors.” No. CIV-A. 489-N, 2006 WL 3783520, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006).
91. If one looks to jurisdictions outside of Delaware applying the Caremark standard, the
universe of cases that survived motions to dismiss expands significantly. See, e.g., In re Abbott
Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th
Cir. 2001), amended on denial of reh’g, 250 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Wells Fargo & Co.
S’holder Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2017); In re Intuitive Surgical
S’holder Derivative Litig., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2015); In re Pfizer Inc. S’holder
Derivative Litig., 722 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Biopure Corp. Derivative Litig., 424
F. Supp. 2d 305 (D. Mass. 2006). Plaintiffs might expect more favorable outcomes in nonDelaware venues, but at least some are limited by charter and bylaw provisions that require
derivative claims to be brought in Delaware courts. See Langevoort, supra note 73, at 735 n.39
(citing Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2016)).
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this way, Caremark has largely been cabined to the most extreme
cases involving legal violations. This evolution is consistent with
corporate law’s focus on establishing legitimacy through affirmations
of legal obedience, but it is often anemic in application and lacks
tailoring to the potential for social value and harm that corporations
produce for shareholders and stakeholders through business and legal
risk. The third part of the discussion concludes with additional
observations about the implications of this doctrinal trend and the
potential for a more capacious approach to oversight claims.
A. The Common Path of Dismissal
Since Caremark, “compliance has grown in size, scope, and
stature at nearly all large corporations.”92 The rise of corporate
compliance systems has been accompanied by a parade of shareholder
litigation defeated at the motion to dismiss stage. Two Delaware cases
illustrate the typical dynamic of directors who fail to provide effective
oversight but succeed in defending against suit: In re Citigroup Inc.93
and In re General Motors Co.94
The first of these cases takes us back to the era of the 2008
financial crisis. Citigroup had approximately $55 billion in exposure to
the subprime mortgage market via collateralized debt obligations and
other investments.95 When the market collapsed, Citigroup suffered
serious financial losses and shareholder litigation followed, claiming
that the director defendants were liable under Caremark for failing to
adequately implement and oversee an information and reporting
system regarding the company’s exposure to the subprime mortgage
market.96 As corporate law scholars James Cox and Randall Thomas
explained in their examination of the case,
The suit alleged ample red flags that should have caught the board’s eye, such as an
economist’s forecast that a speculative bubble was nearing its end, a leading subprime
lender closing its 229 offices, another lender filing bankruptcy, analysts downgrading

92. Langevoort, supra note 73, at 728. The burgeoning literature on compliance includes:
Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009); Sean J.
Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075 (2016);
Langevoort, supra note 69; William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the
Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1999); Veronica Root, The Monitor-“Client”
Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 523 (2014).
93. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 113 (Del. Ch. 2009).
94. In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., No. 9627-VCG, 2015 WL 3958724 (Del. Ch. June
26, 2015), aff’d, 133 A.3d 971 (Del. 2016).
95. In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d at 113.
96. Id. at 114, 123, 128.
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subprime mortgages, and a warning of increasing subprime delinquencies by another
lender.97

In the eyes of the Delaware Court of Chancery, however, the warning
signs “at most . . . evidence[d] that the directors made bad business
decisions.”98 The alleged “ ‘red flags’ . . . amount[ed] to little more than
portions of public documents that reflected the worsening conditions
in the subprime mortgage market and in the economy generally.”99
Consequently, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to plead
“particularized facts suggesting that the Board was presented with
‘red flags’ alerting it to potential misconduct.”100 Despite “staggering
losses” and the understandable “desire to force those responsible to
account for their wrongdoing,” the court would not engage in judicial
second-guessing of what it characterized as business decisions, and
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to adequately
plead demand futility.101
Notably, in 2017, Citigroup directors faced another Caremark
case, stemming from corporate traumas involving anti–money
laundering violations, accounts receivable fraud, fraudulent
manipulation of benchmark foreign exchange rates, and deceptive
card practices.102 The court noted that the plaintiffs had “produced a
ponderous omnibus of a complaint,” describing red flags “dating back
to the financial crisis of a decade ago as well as more recently, in
connection with activities of Citigroup and its subsidiaries that led to
large fines levied against the bank.”103 Again finding the complaint
lacking against Citigroup directors, the court explained: “The
Complaint makes it reasonably conceivable that the directors, despite
these red flags, failed to take actions that may have avoided loss to the
company. That is not the standard, however.”104 In the court’s view,
although the facts suggested bad results, the plaintiffs had not
succeeded in implying that bad faith scienter had existed on the part
of the directors.105
97. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers in a
World with Weak Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L. REV. 19, 54 (2016).
98. In re Citigroup Inc., 964 A.2d at 128.
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting David B. Shaev Profit Sharing Account v. Armstrong, No. CIV.A. 1449-N,
2006 WL 391931, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2006)).
101. Id. at 126, 131, 139–40.
102. Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Corbat, No. 12151-VCG, 2017 WL 6452240, at
*3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2017).
103. Id. at *2.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *24 (noting “[t]he bad results . . . do not imply bad faith”); see also In re Goldman
Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *1, 23–24 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12,
2011) (rejecting the possibility that directors would be liable for establishing and not sufficiently
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Similarly, the ignition switch crisis at General Motors (“GM”)
did not yield Caremark liability for the directors.106 The company had
manufactured cars with defective ignition switches that malfunctioned
during consumer use, leading to a number of serious personal injuries
and deaths, as well as fines and damages from private lawsuits and
government investigations.107 Shortly after the company issued the
first of forty-five recalls, it also disclosed that information about the
ignition defect had been known to certain engineers and other
employees within the company for years.108
GM shareholders brought suit against the directors, alleging
that the board lacked a process by which it adequately received
information about safety risks and the risk of punitive damages in
pending litigation, including National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration inquiries and responses.109
The court observed the story was “sadly familiar”: “An iconic
American company produces a product or service that goes terribly
awry, causing the company financial and reputational damage, and
perhaps doing damage to society at large as well.”110 Reviewing the
specific allegations of the complaint, the court explained: “GM had a
system for reporting risk to the Board, but in the Plaintiffs’ view it
should have been a better system.”111 Granting the motion to dismiss,
the court concluded: “Pleadings, even specific pleadings, indicating
that directors did a poor job of overseeing risk in a poorly-managed
corporation do not imply director bad faith.”112 So long as some boardlevel system exists, and without “red flags” or other bases from which
the court can infer knowledge on the part of the board that its system
was inadequate, the complaint will be dismissed.113
overseeing a compensation structure that incentivized “highly risky trading practices”); Daniel
Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583,
1613–27 (2018) (discussing dismissals in oversight cases involving sexual harassment by highprofile executives and the potential for such cases to survive motions to dismiss).
106. In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., No. 9627-VCG, 2015 WL 3958724 (Del. Ch. June
26, 2015), aff’d, 133 A.3d 971 (Del. 2016).
107. Id.
108. Id. at *2.
109. Id.
110. Id. at *1.
111. Id. at *14.
112. Id. at *17.
113. Hill, supra note 13, at 682–83 (“Having no system of controls will yield liability, but
having an imperfect or even apparently inadequate system generally will not.”); Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487,
491 (2003) (“[A] growing body of evidence indicates that internal compliance structures do not
deter prohibited conduct within firms, and may largely serve a window-dressing function that
provides both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability.”); Langevoort, supra note 73, at 729–
30 (“It is at least arguable that independent directors do not have the capacity to engage with
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As these cases demonstrate, as a matter of corporate law,
courts do not condemn boards for faulty monitoring systems.114 The
case law is replete with failures to provide information to the board,
ineffective oversight to make sure compliance violations do not occur,
and even problematic responses to warning signs that were not well
calculated to resolve compliance issues.115 Corporate boards must have
some system and some response, but in corporate law these are
generally treated as matters of business judgment absent a complete
dearth of board-level monitoring or egregious facts—seemingly any
level of business risk is permissible.116 Concerns that boards would not
be given leeway to exercise discretion concerning their approach to
internal controls and compliance have not come to fruition;117 instead,
the opposite concern emerges upon examination—that managerial
motivations toward business risk and legal compliance are not fully
aligned with achieving optimal deterrence of social harm.118
this complexity, so that Caremark was wise to demand almost nothing beyond asking that some
compliance system exists.”).
114. Federal and state regulatory enforcement is, of course, another matter and not limited
to Caremark’s standard. Langevoort, supra note 73, at 732 (“[I]n principle, at least, regulators
and enforcers who have prosecutorial discretion and the ability to seek compliance-related
sanction adjustment have no reason to feel beholden to Caremark’s focus on corporate well-being,
and almost surely do not in fact.”).
115. See, e.g., Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Corbat, No. 12151-VCG, 2017 WL
6452240, at *17 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2017):
At issue is the duty of loyalty; a board’s efforts can be ineffective, its actions obtuse,
its results harmful to the corporate weal, without implicating bad faith. Bad faith may
be inferred where the directors knew or should have known that illegal conduct was
taking place, yet “took no steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy that
situation.”
(quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)) (emphasis
in original); Horman v. Abney, No. 12290-VCS, 2017 WL 242571, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2017)
(“If the members of the board become aware of the red flags and do nothing in response, and
thereby consciously disregard their fiduciary duties, then they each individually are subject to
liability for a failure of oversight.”).
116. See Langevoort, supra note 73, at 730 (“Caremark was quite clear that these resources
and deployment choices are matters of business judgment, and hence receive strong deference
when made in good faith.”). The Delaware Supreme Court has emphasized that a complete
“dearth of any board-level effort at monitoring” of a significant compliance issue states a claim
for an oversight failure. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809 (Del. 2019) (emphasis added).
117. See, e.g., Bainbridge et al., supra note 55, at 603–04 (expressing concern that after Stone
v. Ritter “a conscious decision by the board of directors that the costs of a law compliance
program outweigh the benefits may no longer be protected by the business judgment rule”).
118. See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 247, 254–55 (Jennifer
Arlen ed., 2018) (arguing that managerial judgment about compliance should be designed to
penalize firms that underinvest in legal precaution from a social risk perspective even if
reasonable in terms of expected shareholder value); Langevoort, supra note 73, at 733 (“Suffice it
to say that managerial motivations toward legal compliance are not fully aligned with either the
corporation’s best interests or the optimal avoidance of social harm.”); Langevoort, supra note 69,
at 970–71 (explaining how corporate culture can vary a firm’s risk-return calculus and how this
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B. The Rare Path of Survival
From the start, the Caremark court announced that this claim
was “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which
a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”119 This oft-quoted refrain
about Caremark has created difficulty for Delaware plaintiffs at the
demand excusal stage, who must demonstrate that a majority of the
board face a “substantial likelihood” of personal liability.120
The small handful of Caremark cases that have survived this
nearly insuperable standard on a motion to dismiss for failure to plead
demand futility or state a viable claim have all included facts that
cross a line between business risk and legal risk. Much has been made
of determining how to analyze cases involving “red flags” and whether
Caremark itself sets the standard for these cases, as it involved none
as a factual matter.121 But in practice, the cases reflect that a more
fundamental sorting is occurring that identifies extreme
circumstances implicating the issue of obedience, which has resonance
for the legitimacy of corporate law, as discussed in Part II above. With
limited exception,122 these cases involve either an utter and absolute
may diverge from society’s optimal precaution point); Partnoy, supra note 74, at 419 (“In general,
oversight based on future expected costs from the regulatory and tort regimes is unlikely to lead
corporations to internalize social costs in an optimal way. Agency costs can lead corporations not
to internalize the difference between social costs and private costs.”).
119. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
120. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993) (“[A] court must determine
whether or not the particularized factual allegations of a derivative stockholder complaint create
a reasonable doubt that, as of the time the complaint is filed, the board of directors could have
properly exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a
demand.”); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984) (stating “substantial
likelihood” aspect of demand futility standard), overruled on other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
121. See, e.g., Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 84, at 2169–77 (examining whether a board has
discharged its monitoring obligation in terms of red flags reaching the board and prompting a
response); Paul Graf, Red Flags in the Morning, Directors Take Warning . . . , 6 BUS. L. BRIEF 19,
19 (2010) (exploring how “[t]he knowledge requirement hinges on what information or signals,
‘red flags,’ come to the board’s attention”); Langevoort, supra note 73, at 735 (“[T]he moment the
board is brought into the compliance risk discussion, liability exposure increases to at least a
small extent, and Caremark itself no longer sets the applicable standard.”); Eric J. Pan,
Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A Critical Assessment of the Delaware Doctrine, 38 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 209, 210 (2011) (criticizing “the Delaware doctrine of the duty to monitor” on
various grounds, including that “the doctrine incentivizes directors to avoid asking questions or
otherwise making efforts to uncover possible red flags”).
122. A small number of cases involved allegations of accounting improprieties or complicity
in self-dealing. See Stewart v. Wilmington Tr. SP Servs., Inc., 112 A.3d 271, 281, 301 (Del. Ch.
2015) (denying a motion to dismiss from a “resident” director who “allegedly went along without
raising a peep” with a “fraudulent scheme year after year”); Saito v. McCall, No. CIV.A. 17132NC, 2004 WL 3029876, at *1, *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2004) (denying a motion to dismiss regarding
an oversight claim that directors “presided over a fraudulent accounting scheme”), overruled on
other grounds, Lambrecht v. O’Neal, 3 A.3d 277 (Del. 2010); see also ATR-Kim Eng Fin. Corp. v.
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failure to put any board-level monitoring in place for an “intrinsically
critical” compliance issue, such as in Marchand,123 or a board that
improperly ignored or managed legal risk, such as in the cases
discussed below.124
To start with a contrast to the Citigroup case from the financial
crisis era, which involved massive amounts of business risk and a
typical result of dismissal, a different case from this time involving the
insurance giant AIG survived a motion to dismiss with allegations of
disobedience.125 The AIG plaintiffs alleged that the directors had
engaged in transactions designed to hide AIG’s true financial
situation, sold illegal financial products, rigged markets, and illegally
avoided taxes. Denying a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the chancery
court explained: “The Complaint fairly supports the assertion that
AIG’s Inner Circle led a—and I use this term with knowledge of its
strength—criminal organization. The diversity, pervasiveness, and
materiality of the alleged financial wrongdoing at AIG is
extraordinary.”126 Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiffs, the court found that “given the pervasiveness of the fraud,
[the defendants] knew that AIG was engaging in illegal conduct.”127
Shareholders similarly pleading pervasive and widespread
fraud also succeeded past motions to dismiss in two cases that arose in
2013 involving Chinese corporations that had accessed the U.S. public
markets through reverse mergers—China Agritech and Fuqi. In
China Agritech, according to the plaintiffs’ allegations, rampant
misconduct was occurring at the company, including the failure to use
proceeds from a securities offering for its stated purpose and “repeated
Araneta, No. CIV.A. 489-N, 2006 WL 3783520, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006) (denying a motion
to dismiss from two directors who acted with “complicity” and as “stooges” for a controlling
shareholder-board chair who engaged in self-dealing). Other noteworthy cases involve litigation
for corporate books and records to investigate potential oversight claims. See In re Facebook, Inc.
Section 220 Litig., No. 2018-0661-JRS, 2019 WL 2320842, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019) (seeking
books and records to investigate potential wrongdoing in the “implementation of a business
model” that violated a FTC consent decree); Melzer v. CNET Networks, Inc., 934 A.2d 912, 913
(Del. Ch. 2007) (seeking inspection of books and records relating to stock option backdating).
123. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 822 (Del. 2019).
124. This argument builds on an earlier observation by Professors Cox and Thomas. See Cox
& Thomas, supra note 97, at 55–56:
Indeed, the division between Massey and Citigroup may be that Citigroup involved a
challenge to legitimate business practices, whereas Massey is riveted, as was
Caremark, on the directors’ conscious disregard of the corporation’s adherence with
the law when implementing business strategies . . . . [T]he facts required to satisfy
even Massey reflect such an abandonment of the directors’ monitoring role as to
suggest outright complicity in the lawless acts rather than a want of oversight.
125. See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 779 (Del. Ch. 2009).
126. Id. at 799.
127. Id. at 782.
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failures to maintain effective internal controls” that ultimately
resulted in delisting from the public exchange.128 Similarly, in Fuqi,
the plaintiffs asserted particularized allegations that “the directors
did nothing to ensure that its reporting mechanisms were accurate”
and “the board knew that it had problems with its accounting and
inventory processes” because it announced a financial restatement.129
After the plaintiff made demand to the board to remedy claimed
breaches of fiduciary duty and improve its internal controls, the board
failed to respond for two years.130 During this time, the directors
allowed $130 million to be transferred out of the company.131 Based on
Fuqi’s self-disclosed accounting inadequacies, the court concluded that
Fuqi “had no meaningful controls in place. The board of directors may
have had regular meetings, and an Audit Committee may have
existed, but there does not seem to have been any regulation of the
company’s operations in China.”132
In total, in both cases the court concluded that the plaintiffs
had pled facts that, when assumed true, were sufficient to infer that
the directors knew that the internal controls were inadequate and had
failed to correct the deficiencies. More generally, the picture that
emerges from the pleadings is of pervasive fraud and that the boards
facilitated, or were complicit, in this wrongdoing.
Three other Delaware cases also succeeded in surviving
motions to dismiss and suggest the directors participated, at some
level, in disobedience: In re Massey Energy Co.; Louisiana Municipal
Police Employees’ Retirement System v. Pyott; and In re Clovis
Oncology, Inc. As the number of cases surviving the motion to dismiss
is exceedingly thin, it is worth examining each in turn.
Massey involved “a coal mining corporation . . . [c]onvinced that
it knew better than the public authorities charged with enforcing laws
designed to make mining a safer and cleaner business.”133 Tragedy
struck amid this company culture of lax safety precautions: an
explosion occurred at one of the company’s mines in West Virginia,
resulting in the death of twenty-nine miners.134 This tragedy “was not
128. In re China Agritech, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 7163-VCL, 2013 WL 2181514,
at *18 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013).
129. Rich ex rel. Fuqi Int’l., Inc. v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 983–84 (Del. Ch. 2013).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 983. The court further noted: “[E]ven if I were to find that Fuqi had some system
of internal controls in place, I may infer that the board’s failure to monitor that system was a
breach of fiduciary duty.” Id.
133. In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL
2176479, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011).
134. Id.
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the first time that Massey miners had suffered death and serious
injuries.”135 The company “had pled guilty to criminal charges, had
suffered other serious judgments and settlements as a result of
violations of law, had been caught trying to hide violations of law and
suppress material evidence, and had miners suffer death and serious
injuries at its facilities.”136 Shareholder litigation followed, alleging
that the Massey directors did not make a good faith effort to ensure
that the company complied with its legal obligations.137
On a procedural posture seeking a preliminary injunction
against a merger, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had likely
pled a Caremark claim that would survive a motion to dismiss, even
under the heightened pleading standard applicable under Rule 23.1.138
Crucial to this finding were extensive factual allegations suggesting
that the Massey directors had knowingly caused the company to seek
profit by violating the law.139 According to the detailed pleading, the
company culture involved a CEO and other top managers that
knowingly flouted applicable miner safety laws, took an openly
aggressive attitude against the relevant agency, made cost-cutting
decisions to put miners at risk, publicly suggested that they knew
mine safety better than the regulators, and “often argued with the law
itself.”140 The directors were allegedly under the domination of this
management and had participated in “foster[ing] a business strategy
expressly designed to put coal production and higher profits over
compliance with the law.”141 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs had successfully pled “particularized facts creating an
inference that the Board and management were aware of a troubling
continuing pattern of non-compliance in fact and of a managerial
attitude suggestive of a desire to fight with and hide evidence from the
company’s regulators.”142 Again, as in the China Agritech and Fuqi
cases, Massey was not a straightforward case of failed business
oversight, but rather one that suggested something more—that the
directors had engaged in disobedience.
Pyott presents another example fitting this pattern. In that
case, plaintiff-shareholders brought a Caremark claim against the
Allergan board for failing to prevent the company’s violations of the
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id. at *20.
Id.
Id. at *21.
Id. at *20.
Id. at *19–21.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *21.
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ban on off-label drug marketing.143 Doctors can legally prescribe a
drug such as Botox for an off-label therapeutic use that is not FDA
approved, but it is illegal for a manufacturer to market a drug for such
off-label use.144 Allergan’s annual report reflected an understanding of
“the critical distinction between off-label sales and marketing,”145 and
its general counsel advised the board about an FDA inquiry and
incident that indicated the company had likely engaged in illegal
conduct in its marketing practices.146 Despite this warning, “the Board
discussed and approved a series of annual strategic plans that
contemplated expanding Botox sales dramatically within geographic
areas that encompassed the United States” and those “plans
contemplated new markets for Botox that involved applications that
were off-label uses in the United States.”147 Allergan eventually
entered into a settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice
pursuant to which Allergan pled guilty to criminal misdemeanor
misbranding and paid a total of $600 million in civil and criminal
fines.148
Denying the motion to dismiss, Vice Chancellor Travis Laster
remarked, “It is not unreasonable to infer that the Board and CEO
saw the distinction between off-label selling and off-label marketing as
a source of legal risk to be managed, rather than a boundary to be
avoided.”149 The complaint set out detailed factual allegations that
“the CEO and his management team devised, and the Board approved,
a business plan that relied on off-label-use-promoting activities,
confident that the risk of regulatory detection was low, that most
regulatory problems could be solved, and that dealing with regulatory
risk was a cost of doing business.”150 Pyott thus involved more than an
allegation of conscious disregard for duties—rather, it implicated a
direct connection between the board and a business plan premised on
illegal activity.151
143. La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 316 (Del. Ch. 2012), overruled on
other grounds, 74 A.3d 612 (Del. 2013).
144. Id. at 317–18.
145. Id. at 318.
146. Id. at 320.
147. Id. at 352.
148. Id. at 316.
149. Id. at 355.
150. Id. at 356.
151. See Melbourne Mun. Firefighters’ Pension Tr. Fund v. Jacobs, No. 10872-VCMR, 2016
WL 4076369, at *12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2016) (“[T]he board’s alleged bad faith in Pyott was not
based on its conscious disregard for its duty to prevent the company from engaging in illegal
conduct. Instead it was based on the board’s alleged decision to cause the company to engage in
illegal conduct.”); see also In re Facebook, Inc. Section 220 Litig., No. 2018-0661-JRS, 2019 WL
2320842, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019) (granting plaintiffs’ request for books and records to

2019]

CORPORATE OVERSIGHT AND DISOBEDIENCE

2041

Finally, the plaintiffs in Clovis Oncology pled with particularity
a Caremark claim alleging that the directors of a biopharmaceutical
company “did nothing” after repeatedly receiving signals from
management that the company was violating the FDA’s clinical trial
protocol for its most promising drug under review.152 These protocols
and related FDA regulations were “mission critical regulatory issues”
for the company, which had no drugs on the market, and the
defendants “viewed detailed information” regarding the clinical trial
at each board meeting.153 Although less egregious than some cases
that have survived a motion to dismiss, the Clovis Oncology pleadings
nonetheless fit the pattern described of a board that allegedly
facilitated, or was complicit, in wrongdoing.
Most problematic was the plaintiff’s allegation that the board
knowingly ignored “that the Company was violating—perhaps
consciously violating—the [clinical trial] protocol and then misleading
the market and regulators” about the company’s “mission critical
product.”154 In the face of management’s revelation that it was
improperly calculating drug trial success, the board, “comprised of
experts,” had allegedly “allowed the Company to deceive regulators
and the market regarding the drug’s efficacy.”155
In all these cases, plaintiff–shareholders survived motions to
dismiss with detailed factual allegations that suggested defendant
directors not only ignored red flags, but had gone farther down a path
of participation or complicity in wrongdoing. Caremark claims in these
cases resemble allegations of disobedience—facts supporting an
inference that directors knew or should have known the corporation
was engaged in legal risk or illegality.
In the recent case involving Duke Energy before the Delaware
Supreme Court,156 a divergence of opinion on the application of this
principle explains the filing of majority and dissenting opinions. In
this case, the country’s largest electricity producer suffered a ruptured
pipe that sent coal ash and toxic wastewater into the Dan River. It led
the company to plead guilty to nine misdemeanor criminal violations
of the Federal Clean Water Act and to pay a fine exceeding $100

investigate potential wrongdoing by the Facebook directors and top executives in
“implement[ing] a business model that exposed private user data to unauthorized third-party
access” in violation of a FTC consent decree).
152. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222, 2019 WL 4850188, at *6
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019).
153. Id. at *13.
154. Id. at *10, *14.
155. Id. at *1, *6, *14.
156. City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Sys. v. Good, 177 A.3d 47, 65 (Del. 2017).
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million. The majority saw the case as fitting the typical pattern
appropriate for dismissal, in which plaintiffs “conflate the bad
outcome of the criminal proceedings with the actions of the board.”157
It interpreted management presentations to the board on the status of
environmental problems as evidence that the board had taken some
action to address regulatory concerns, concluding that the board
therefore
had
not
consciously
disregarded
its
oversight
responsibility.158 Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr. dissented, finding
that the facts raised a pleading stage inference that “it was the
business strategy of Duke Energy, accepted and supported by its
board of directors, to run the company in a manner that purposely
skirted, and in many ways consciously violated, important
environmental laws.”159
Chief Justice Strine acknowledged that the differing views on
the court with regard to the Caremark claim resulted from whether
the facts were interpreted as legal disobedience:
Sadly, my dissent rests on my reluctant conclusion that the facts as pled support a fair
inference that the board was all too aware that Duke’s business strategy involved
flouting important laws, while employing a strategy of political influence-seeking and
cajolement to reduce the risk that the company would be called to fair account. Under
the facts as pled, the only surprising thing about the Dan River spill that gave rise to
the state regulator’s issuance of a $6.8 million fine, twenty-three Notice of Violation
letters, twenty-six Notice of Deficiency letters, and a finding that Duke committed more
than 760 daily violations of environmental regulations, in addition to other severe civil
and criminal penalties related to Duke’s operations at other sites, is that something like
it did not happen years earlier.160

The pleadings of extensive legal violations over a significant
period of time, combined with evidence that the corporation cultivated
lax oversight from the state regulator and helped to elect a governor
who had spent decades as a Duke Energy employee, supported an
inference that the board was aware the corporation was not on a path
toward legal compliance. Although the management made
presentations to the board on the status of environmental problems,
the broader set of facts puts the case in line with other narratives of
disobedience and underscores the rare path of survival for Caremark
claims in Delaware.

157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 59.
Id.
Id. at 65 (Strine, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 68.
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C. Implications and Future Directions
Drawing together these threads of discussion on the role of
good faith and the doctrinal convergence of Caremark and
disobedience, two additional observations emerge.
First, Caremark case law has been shaped by an emphasis on
the line between business risk and legal risk. We can understand this
distinction in light of corporate law’s aim to further legal obedience
and its own legitimacy. It is not, however, a distinction based on an
evaluation of the merits of the underlying business activity, and it
ultimately informs what we can expect of the doctrine.161
The approach taken in the case law suggests, for example, that
a distinction might be drawn between a financial institution that
takes massive amounts of business risk—which would not give rise to
oversight liability—and an innovative startup that knowingly flouts
laws—which could potentially result in liability.162 Notably, the social
value or harm created by each of these activities—for shareholders
and stakeholders—is arguable and context specific,163 but corporate

161. See Asbestos Workers Local 42 Pension Fund v. Bammann, No. 9772-VCG, 2015 WL
2455469, at *14 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2015) (“It is not entirely clear under what circumstances a
stockholder derivative plaintiff can prevail against the directors on a theory of oversight liability
for failure to monitor business risk under Delaware law; the Plaintiff cites no examples where
such an action has successfully been maintained.”); In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder
Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *21 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (“As a preliminary
matter, this Court has not definitively stated whether a board’s Caremark duties include a duty
to monitor business risk.”); see also Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Corbat, No. 12151VCG, 2017 WL 6452240, at 18* (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2017):
Banamex made a risky business decision that turned out poorly for the company. That
suggests a failure to monitor or properly limit business risk, a theory of director
liability that this Court has never definitively accepted. Indeed, evaluation of risk is a
core function of the exercise of business judgment;
Reiter ex rel. Capital One Fin. Corp. v. Fairbank, No. 11693-CB, 2016 WL 6081823, at *8 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 18, 2016) (“In applying the Caremark theory of liability, even in the face of alleged red
flags, this Court has been careful to distinguish between failing to fulfill one’s oversight
obligations with respect to fraudulent or criminal conduct as opposed to monitoring the business
risk of the enterprise.”); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del.
Ch. 2009) (“There are significant differences between failing to oversee employee fraudulent or
criminal conduct and failing to recognize the extent of a Company’s business risk.”).
162. The recent Caremark case involving the founder and directors of ride-hailing company
Uber is instructive. The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed the suit because the inaction at
issue was not connected to the alleged corporate culture of lawbreaking—the legal violations and
monitoring at issue did not concern a “single topic” as the mining law violations had in Massey.
See McElrath v. Kalanick, No. 2017-0888-SG, 2019 WL 1430210, at *13 (Del. Ch. April 1, 2019).
The case might have come out differently if the pleadings had, for example, concerned the
conscious disregard of pervasive taxi law violations instead of Uber’s acquisition of Otto, which
led to a lawsuit by Google for misappropriation of intellectual property.
163. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 14, at 731–32 (noting the potential for social value in
some activity that pushes or transgresses legal boundaries); see also Langevoort, supra note 69,
at 936 (noting that psychologists have found experimental evidence linking cognitive creativity
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law does not enter that debate. Corporate law instead seeks to
preserve the legitimacy of broad business discretion by setting
minimal process thresholds for compliance and otherwise drawing a
strict prohibition against the conscious or intentional managing of risk
of legal enforcement.
As a consequence, absent a dramatic shift in approach, the
oversight doctrine is not an effective tool for holding fiduciaries
accountable for failures to monitor business risk.164 Furthermore, as
corporate law does not evaluate the merits of external laws or provide
exceptions to the obligation of legal obedience, the Caremark doctrine
could be problematic for fiduciaries of innovative companies that
bump up against regulations.165 Oversight liability may be unlikely in
light of the obstacles involved in derivative litigation, the lack of
incentive for shareholders to bring suit if the company breaks laws in
pursuit of profit, and the potential defense that it was unclear how
existing laws would apply to an innovative product or service and thus
there was no conscious disregard or intent.166 Nonetheless, it is
notable that corporate law disfavors businesses that engage in legal
risk.
Second, examining the Delaware case law reveals that two
separate doctrines have evolved within the duty of good faith—
obedience and oversight. In practice to date, the Caremark oversight
obligation has been cabined to extreme cases involving legal
violations, such as in cases of utter failure to engage in critical boardlevel oversight of legal compliance, allegedly pervasive wrongdoing,
complicity in fraudulent or illegal business models and practices,
misleading regulators, and repeat offenders. Corporate law’s
commitment to the rule of law certainly supports oversight
accountability in these instances of utter failure and disobedience.167

and unethical behavior, thus leading to “the conundrum that the origins of noncompliance may
be found in seemingly benign—even prized—behaviors, traits and cultural artifacts that are
thought to generate success in a hyper-competitive marketplace”).
164. For this reason, defendants might also attempt to characterize their monitoring activity
as related to business risk and to otherwise show that they acted in good faith. For an argument
that some cases are “blended” insofar as they involve a legal violation but the damages sought
also include losses caused by bad business oversight, see Ezra Wasserman Mitchell, Caremark’s
Hidden Promise, 51 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 239, 256–64 (2018).
165. See Elizabeth Pollman, The Rise of Regulatory Affairs in Innovative Startups, in THE
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (D. Gordon Smith, Christine
Hurt & Brian Broughman eds., forthcoming 2020) (identifying developments contributing to the
rise of regulatory affairs in innovative startups).
166. Pollman, supra note 14, at 750–57.
167. Some corporations that engage in activity that pushes the boundaries of lawfulness may
succeed in gaining popular support and even changing or clarifying the law, which may in turn
be relevant to the analysis from a corporate law perspective. The cases discussed in Section III.B,
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Moreover, corporate law’s commitment to the rule of law
supports a more robust application of oversight duties. The Delaware
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Marchand signals a willingness to
recognize pleadings of an utter failure to establish a board-level
monitoring system as required under the first prong of Caremark.
Regarding the second prong, this Article’s analysis suggests that the
Caremark standard need not be applied so stringently as to require
disobedience bordering on outright complicity or knowing misconduct.
The stated standard of conscious disregard is amply capacious to also
capture fiduciaries acting with willful ignorance or an awareness that
their efforts at compliance are insufficient. The relevant inquiry is not
the effectiveness of the system of compliance and monitoring, as such,
but rather whether the fiduciary acted in good faith in actively
attempting to carry out these obligations with the aim of full legal
compliance. A stronger approach is possible and would further the
public-regarding purpose of the good faith obligation and affirm that
oversight liability can stem from conduct that falls short of an intent
to violate law, which has been recognized as a separate basis for
liability.
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the legitimizing role of the duty of
good faith in corporate law and the doctrinal convergence of oversight
and disobedience. Corporate law acknowledges societal interests in the
rule of law and embeds a safety valve for public policy in the
obligations of fiduciaries that cannot be eliminated. The corporate law
requirements of legal obedience and oversight preserve the ability for
courts to flexibly respond to violations of public trust and provide
legitimacy for the larger enterprise of state-chartered corporations.
Examining the Caremark doctrine on oversight responsibility,
however, reveals that in practice the potential for accountability
through fiduciary law has been narrowly circumscribed. With limited
exception, the small handful of oversight cases decided by Delaware
courts that have survived motions to dismiss involved pleadings of
either a complete lack of board-level oversight or egregious
disobedience such as allegations that a corporation was engaged in
pervasive wrongdoing or directors were complicit in fraudulent
business models or practices. Furthermore, in case law to date,
Delaware courts have prioritized giving directors broad latitude to
however, do not fit this characterization and instead reflect legal violations with little to no
potential for social value or legal change or clarification.
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take business risk by drawing a line at legal risk, despite the
possibility that both types of activity could create social value or harm
depending on the circumstances. Bringing together these
observations, this Article’s analysis concludes that corporate law’s
public-regarding commitment to the rule of law supports
accountability in these instances as well as applying a more robust
understanding of the obligations of oversight and obedience.

